Zambia-China relations were established on 29 October 1964, exactly five days after the British protectorate of Northern Rhodesia became the independent Republic of Zambia. At the state level, Zambia-China relations have remained largely unscathed for the past six decades, owing to the positive narratives of China promoted by successive Zambian governments.
However, it hasn’t all been smooth sailing. Iso Lomso fellow Emmanuel Matambo of the Centre for Africa-China Studies at the University of Johannesburg sees this relationship as divided into three epochs − ideological kinship and the dominance of state-level diplomacy (1964-1991); economic interest, non-state perceptions and the politicisation of China and the Chinese in Zambia (1991-2005/6); and, the increasing salience of subaltern perceptions of the Chinese (2005-present). Matambo aims to delve into the layered Zambian perceptions of China (the State), the Chinese (public and private enterprises, corporations, and individual players), and Zambia-China relations across these distinct yet intersecting periods.
“Forged in the heyday of Africa’s anticolonial struggle and China’s quest (up to 1971) to be a member of the United Nations, Zambia-China relations have become more layered, dramatised, sensationalised and sullied by episodes of rancorous tension (some of it fatal), rumour (centred around Zambia’s debt to China and its possibly adverse ramifications for Zambia), alarming speculation (about the likely impact on Zambia’s sovereignty if it fails to service its debt to China) and political opportunism,” he said.
Explaining his interest in the topic, Matambo highlighted his positionality as a Zambia-born academic. Still, he also described Zambia’s relationship with China as being at the cutting-edge of the ‘China in Africa’ discourse. According to Matambo, “Zambia-China relations demonstrate the evolving and increasingly layered phases of China’s presence in Africa. “This relationship straddles three areas,” he said, “Cold War, neoliberal orthodoxy, and the rise of China’s global economic engagement. In this period, Zambia has experienced different political systems and changes in power, opening space for our increased understanding of how China in Africa interacts with different political systems.”
Matambo uses constructivism as the theoretical framework for his project, drawing on secondary material, media reportage, archival data and (online and in-person) interviews mainly in Zambia, Tanzania, China, the United States, and South Africa. The constructivist prism underlines the importance of norms, ideas, and identity and interest construction in shaping the quality of relations among nations. Simply put, international relations are social and are shaped by the ideas that actors impart to one another and those that they promote to each other to direct relations in a particular course. Matambo goes further to argue that the case in Zambia shows that state monopoly over influencing international relations is slipping, especially in electoral democracies where the views and narratives of ordinary citizens could have a determining effect on state behaviour. Thus, Matambo says, he is “interested in understanding how ordinary people view the Zambia-China relationship.” He insists on framing the relations as Zambia-China rather China-Zambia as he intends to put Zambia, and ipso facto Africa, at the centre of analysis.”
Ideological kinship and state-level diplomacy (the first epoch)
Zambia is one of 16 landlocked African countries. Lack of access to seaports has always made it economically vulnerable, while its location near Zimbabwe, South Africa and Angola placed it in the midst of a politically vulnerable – at times hostile – region, especially when it supported or accommodated liberation movements within the region. Its economic vulnerability was also heightened by its reliance on copper, which comprises 70% of the country’s export revenue.
China in the 1960s was not the economic powerhouse of today. Led by Mao Zedong, there was a focus on keeping China ideologically pure, and economics was not overtly prioritised. In addition to ideological purity, Mao wanted recognition in the United Nations, which China received in 1971 with massive African support at the expense of Taiwan.
“During the first epoch, China’s Mao and Zambia’s Kenneth Kaunda highlighted China’s Third World solidarity with Africa’s liberation struggle,” said Matambo. “A firm bond was created that was stable and cordial based on solidarity.” In addition, the two parties also converged on criticising Western equivocality on the liberation of Africa. Thus, while Zambia was not an avowed socialist country as China and Tanzania were, it sought to pursue a hybrid philosophy called humanism, which blended socialist, Africanist and Christian elements – this did nothing to undermine the closeness that was forged at the time.
But the bond did dip a toe into the economic realm with Chinese support in the building of the TANZARA railway line, which gave Zambia an alternative transportation route via Tanzania. While TAZARA failed to live up to its economic expectations, its diplomatic symbolism was powerful, and it presented China as Zambia’s ‘all-weather’ partner, poised to lessen dependency on Zambia’s reactionary neighbour in Rhodesia, and apartheid South Africa.
Economics over ideology (the second epoch)
“The demise of the Kaunda regime in 1991 ushered in a second epoch during which solidarity was replaced by China’s economic interests, Zambia’s return to multiparty democracy amid continued economic difficulty, and the politicisation of Zambia-China relations by opposition actors in Zambia,” said Matambo.
He described China’s dramatic return in the 1990s as being about accessing mineral and energy resources − a move that caused discomfort in the West, which described China as a neocolonial power and rogue investor. The underlying perception among Western detractors of China’s increasing footprint in Africa was that Africa – described in the West as a hopeless continent – lacked the requisite agency to decide for itself which international players to court, and on what terms.
In this second epoch, China was no longer poor, was fast becoming the factory of the world, and was openly looking for energy, mineral resources and economic opportunities. Between 2000 and 2006, China’s contribution to global output growth was 23.7%, and it had a lot of money to invest in Zambian infrastructure.
The 1996 African tour by Chinese leader Jiang Zemin focused on countries that recognised China. “There was clear appreciation of Africa as a market for Chinese goods; open rejection of the prevailing Afro-pessimism; and a focus on non-interference in domestic affairs and on China-Africa co-operation.”
Where the West saw despair, China saw opportunity and prioritised economics over ideology. It was strictly business, not politics, and governments in Africa, including Zambia, didn’t want the West telling them what to do.”
Non-state perceptions and increasing politicisation (the third epoch)
“The third (current) epoch encompasses economic interests and the increasingly palpable perceptions of non-state and subaltern actors,” continued Matambo. “With increasing frequency, ordinary Zambians are interacting with Chinese individuals plying their trade in Zambia, not under state auspices.” (Although he also noted that while there are many more private Chinese companies in operation, many so-called private companies have state backing, which makes it hard to differentiate.)
From an economic point of view, things are good. “Trade volume was at $3.56 million in the first half of 2025 – representing a 15.5% increase year on year,” he said. “Zambia recorded a trade surplus of $1.92 million in the same period and is one of the few countries in the world that has a trade surplus with China.”
“State relations have continued, and so have investments. There are MOUs, skills training and cooperation agreements for ongoing projects, but there is also increased speculation of Zambia’s capitulation to Chinese pressure.”
“Chinese state and private interests are not necessarily aligned, and state opinions of China remain positive but contested,” he added.
However, perceptions from ordinary people have declined, with Afrobarometer estimating a drop in positive perceptions from 72% to 42% between 2014 and 2022.
Matambo pointed to ongoing critique of how China does business, the behaviour of Chinese migrants, cultural clashes and problems in worker relationships.
“From my interviews with ordinary citizens, there is a complexity to how China is perceived that doesn’t always align with the state,” he said. “It’s often a mixture of resentment and resignation.”
“This is complicated by the high unemployment rate. The Chinese are employing people who would otherwise be destitute. But there is a racial undertone on both sides to everything, although in any employer-employee dichotomy, employers wield asymmetrical power, and hence it is their racial biases that hold material sway. These realities eventuate in personal-level interaction between Chinese and Zambian individuals that is not as stable as at the state level.”
But how does he think this relationship should move forward?
“The Zambian government must know what it wants. It cannot be preached to by the West, but also cannot unquestioningly accept China,” he replied. “The government also inadvertently inflames rumours about alleged Chinese takeovers due to the lack of transparency, which spawns speculation. The voice of ordinary Zambians is important. Leaders should pay more attention.”
Article: Michelle Galloway
Photo: Curt Ruiters, Quickclick Productions