“My focus is on Kenya and how ethnic identity or socially constructed identities affect governance effectiveness and development outcomes,” said Karuti Kanyinga of the Institute for Development Studies, University of Nairobi. “This study examines the ‘ethnic dilemma’ in Kenya by analysing the relationship between ethnicity, inequality and governance.”
“My argument is that ethnic identity structures access to state and political power, and access to political power shapes resource distribution,” he continued. “This worsens and deepens inequality, which, in turn, undermines governance and development.”
Kanyinga explained that themes of ethnicity, governance and political practice in Africa command attention across the continent and that the relationship between ethnicity, social class and political power has attracted considerable scholarly focus, with many studies examining how access to state power facilitates wealth accumulation among political elites. “Studies have also explored how political dominance is achieved by mobilising ethnic groups during political competition and how this leads to political violence,” he said. “This instrumentalisation of ethnicity and its consequences on governance and development remain an issue of policy and scholarly attention.”
He explained that although identity and inequality occur everywhere, how they are managed is important. Using the examples of Belgium and Switzerland, where language can be divisive, he noted that this is addressed through laws and policies like proportional representation and, in some countries, alternating the presidency between language groups.
He explained that if these challenges and the resulting vulnerabilities and marginalisation based on identity are passed from generation to generation, then the society may remain in perpetual conflict.
Kanyinga’s study explores how the primacy of ethnic identity in political competition in Kenya particularly influences the persistence of regional imbalances in resource allocation. He emphasised that many African countries, including Kenya, have historical disparities in development across ethnic regions and that reforms have not made much progress. “We need to understand the interlinkages between socially constructed identities and what it means for governance effectiveness and social development to understand why Africa lags in development.”
“Ethnicity and inequality in Africa are often poorly managed, and violent conflicts occur around policies and the organisation of political power,” he said.
Divisive colonial roots
Kanyinga noted that under colonial rule, Britain divided Kenya into White Highlands and reserves, with infrastructure developed only in areas that benefited the colonial settler economy. “Nothing much has changed 60 years later,” he said.
After nearly 80 years of colonial rule, Kenya became independent in 1963, and in the 1970s and 80s was initially seen as an African success story. The growth rate was exceptional, as was the development of infrastructure and services, with GDP above the African average. “It was seen as an example of Western development taking off in Africa and favourably compared with countries in East and South-East Asia.”
So, what went wrong? Kanyinga explained that the political choices were different. In Asian countries, there was a focus on agrarian revolution, land rights and disciplined industrialisation. Innovation was prioritised, and they made choices that mattered in healthcare, education and transportation.
“But not in Kenya. Unequal distribution of basic services and weak accountability remained, with policies adopted that could not alter structural imbalances in development. New policies continued to concentrate development in areas dominated by the colonial settler economy. And governance didn’t change – there was a concentration of power in the presidency without checks and balances. They didn’t alter the economic structure.”
“Also, importantly, presidents had to depend on ethnic elites to remain in power. Political power was used for self-interest in resource distribution and political appointments, which marginalised everyone else.”
“Some also argue it was not authentic development because it lacked indigenous capital.”
A divided society
Even at independence, ethno-regional political parties were formed with no real national movements. This divisiveness has continued. Kanyinga pointed out that according to the 2019 national census, there were over 40 ethnic groups, with five of these constituting 65% of the population – the largest, the Kikuyu, comprising about 17 per cent. “But this isn’t stable,” he said, “identities mutate, they change based on the issues. None can mobilise enough to win the presidency on their own.”
“Socially constructed ethnic identities are needed to win elections and to structure access to opportunities and political power,” he said. “Then you have pressure from below to address your constituencies or support base to retain power. It’s been a phenomenon for years.”
It also leads to somewhat uneasy bedfellows, as alliances are formed to attain and remain in power. “Presidential elections are usually too close to call, meaning there are not sufficient numbers to govern and no broad-based legitimacy. So, they must make pacts, often forging these with handshakes after violence.”
“Elections severely impact economic and agricultural growth,” he added. “Growth slows during elections, but post-election elite pacts provide temporary stability.”
The longer-term results are poor governance, reduced accountability, and heightened politicisation of patronage, with many remaining marginalised and excluded, leading to grievances and protests.
“It’s a Kenya of conflict and contradictions but also resilience.”
Kanyinga also pointed to the development of a new constitution in 2010 as a result of the serious post-election violence in 2007. He described it as based on South Africa’s Bill of Rights and a good constitution that emphasises opportunities and social development, but has not led to good programmes. “The constitution aimed to address historical imbalances; however, there are persistent imbalances in the allocation of national development resources.”
Enter Gen Z
Into this complex arena, Gen Z-led protests erupted in June 2024 in response to the Finance Bill, which proposed steep tax hikes on essential goods like fuel, internet data and sanitary products. But besides economic grievances, the protests were also fuelled by systemic governance failures, entrenched corruption and exclusion from decision-making.
“The first group of Gen Z protesters were upper-class children from elite universities,” explained Kanyinga. “They were very conscious about rights and spoke boldly about accountability. Gen Z protests were organic, unlike previous protests managed by political elites.”
“They caused a storm by shifting politics from ethnicity to issue-based, from patronage to accountability. They also made use of digital spaces, a new way of organising politics. They are not only linked to domestic struggles but have also assisted in countries like Uganda and Tanzania. But harsh state repression has limited their effectiveness.”
In conclusion, he offered the following: “The first-past-the-post system means you must mobilise along ethnic lines, but this causes conflicts resolved through elite pacts. This weakens accountability, impacts governance effectiveness and reproduces inequalities. A weak culture of accountability alongside increased political patronage deepens inequalities. Elite pacts don’t address the underlying problems, and marginalisation leads to conflict. There has been some institutional reform, but the political system is unchanged. And, the Gen Z protests are moving it towards accountability-based politics.”
“However, change would not be a walk in the park,” he concluded. ‘It needs to be incremental.”
“We must pay attention globally to the challenges faced by democracies – including conservatism and reactionary forces, much of which is identity-based. These are not good times.”
Article: Michelle Galloway
Photo: Curt Ruiters, Quickclick Productions